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Abstract
This paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive deals or introductory offers to
dominate a market in the face of entry when network effects rather than scale economies are present.
When consumers can only join one or other firm, the incumbent will make discriminatory offers that
are anticompetitive and inefficient. Allowing consumers to multihome, we find offers that only require
consumers to commit to purchase from the incumbent are not anticompetitive, while contracts which
prevent consumers from also buying from the entrant in the future are anticompetitive and inefficient.
The finding extends to two-sided markets, where the incumbent signs up “sellers” exclusively with
attractive offers and exploits “buyers”.
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1 Introduction
In existing models of naked exclusion such as in Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000),
scale economies allow an incumbent to exclude a rival by signing up customers to deny the rival the
necessary scale to profitably enter. This paper provides an example of naked exclusion where such scale
economies can be completely absent. Instead, our model relies on an incumbent which sells a good
subject to network effects. The incumbent can sign up consumers prior to the entry of a rival firm. By
attracting a sufficient number of consumers to its network, the incumbent reduces the demand for the
entrant’s product from the remaining consumers, thereby denying even a more efficient rival the ability
to profitably sell to any consumers in head-to-head competition.
This simple logic is extended to take into account that in network markets consumers will often want
to multihome, that is buy from both firms so as to obtain greater network benefits. When consumers
can multihome, the incumbent may no longer be able to profit just by signing up consumers before the
entrant competes with it. Provided it is not too costly to do so, consumers that sign with the incumbent
will later also buy from the entrant, if its network is intrinsically more desirable. In order that signing
up consumers in the initial stage remains profitable for the incumbent, it must instead do so exclusively.
Consumers that sign with the incumbent not only have to commit to buy from the incumbent but must
also agree not to purchase from the entrant as well. Where such contracts are feasible, the incumbent
will profitably sign up some of the available consumers, doing so exclusively, and then exploit those that
do not sign subsequently. Such exclusive deals raise the incumbent’s profit at the expense of the entrant,
at the expense of those consumers not offered exclusive deals, and at the expense of efficiency.
Our main finding is that in the absence of significant economies of scale for the entrant or costs
to firms of dealing with each customer, contracts in which consumers commit to purchase from the
incumbent before the entrant competes in the market do not harm competition or lower welfare, while
contracts which prevent consumers from also buying from the entrant in the future are anticompetitive
and inefficient. We show this conclusion also holds in a two-sided market setting, where the incumbent
signs up sellers exclusively and then exploits buyers. Buyers have all their surplus exploited while sellers
benefit from exclusive deals. A ban on the use of such contracts by an incumbent prior to competition
from an entrant can raise consumer surplus and welfare.
Our analysis applies to the use of exclusive dealing in markets with network effects. Balto (1999)
and Shapiro (1999) contain detailed discussions of exclusionary actions in a number of these markets,
including ATM networks, computer reservation systems, credit card networks, floral delivery networks,
Pay-TV, and video game systems. Here we note three such examples, all of which suggest exclusive
dealing may act as a powerful barrier to entry in network industries (the example of Pay-TV is discussed
in Section 5).
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Florist Telegraph Delivery (FTD) network developed in the 1940s so that people could send flowers
to distant locations through other member flourists. It enjoyed the participation of the majority of large
flourists. To prevent flourists trying to develop their own such networks, FTD adopted an exclusionary
rule that florists could only be members if they did not belong to any other such network. In the face of
strong network effects, these exclusive membership rules made it difficult for new networks to offer their
customers a comparable service. Only once the Antitrust Division and the FTD entered into a constent
decree in 1956, in which the FTD dropped its exclusive membership rule, did other floral networks such
as AFS and Teleflora emerge. This decree still remains in effect — in fact, in 1995 it resulted in an
Antitrust Division action over FTD’s incentive program “FTD only” which was also deemed to have a
similar exclusivity effect.
In the video game industry, Nintendo became a hit in 1985 with its popular Nintendo Entertainment
System. It, however, maintained tight control over game developers. Among other things, it required
game developers make their games exclusively available on its system for two years following their release.
Developers of hit games therefore preferred to produce them for Nintendo rather than its rivals (Atari
and Sega), given Nintendo’s much larger installed base of users at the time. As a result, consumers had
no reason to shift to one of the rival systems. Shapiro (1999, p.4) notes that Nintendo dominated the
video game business from 1985-1992 and that its “grip on the market relaxed only after it abandoned
these practices in the face of antitrust challenge.”
A final example is the exclusivity practices used by Western Union in the money transfer industry.
Until 1979, Western Union operated as a regulated monopolist in the market for wire money transfers.
The system was based on a network of money transfer agents, with agents benefiting from the presence
of many other agents which belong to the same network. In 1979, FCC deregulated the industry and
allowed entry by other money transfer networks. However successful entry took more than a decade, until
the entry of Moneygram, an American Express subsidiary, in the late 1980s. According to Balto (1999),
the main reason for such belated entry was the long-term exclusive deals Western Union had in place
with many of its agents. The entry attempt by Citibank, in the mid-eighties failed due to impossibility of
building a large enough network of agents in the face of the large number of exclusive deals that Western
Union had.1 Thus, it seems that the combination of network effects and exclusive deals may have been a
powerful barrier to entry in this industry. Our model provides a formal setting to consider such claims.
Throughout the paper we assume consumer expectations that minimize the scope for coordination
failures amongst consumers. For instance, the coordination failure in the existing naked exclusion liter-
ature, in which consumers signing contracts would do better if they could coordinate on an equilibrium
1The successful entry of Moneygram may be attributed to its unique advantage as an American Express subsidiary. It
could simply rely on the network of travel offices and money order agents of American Express which was already established.
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that allows for entry does not arise in our setting. Despite this, consumers in aggregate are still worse
off as a result of exclusive deals. This reflects the ability of the incumbent to divide consumers’ interests,
by making an attractive offer to a group of users initially, and then exploiting the remaining users in the
subsequent competition game.
Our paper connects with several related literatures. Berheim and Whinston (1998) explain the general
ability of exclusive deals to be anticompetitive when cross-market links are present. Such cross-market
links naturally arise in markets with network effects, since convincing some consumers to commit to
purchasing its product, a firm increases the benefit to the remaining consumers from purchasing its
product as well. Our analysis highlights the role of limited offers and exclusivity conditions, which
the incumbent uses to split the market in order to exploit cross-market effects, as well as the role of
multihoming and consumer expectations in determining how exclusive deals work.
When multihoming is assumed not to be possible, exclusive deals can be interpreted as simple pur-
chase commitments or introductory offers. These offers are similar to those studied in earlier models of
introductory pricing in markets with network effects, such as that of Katz and Shapiro (1986). They
assume two different groups of consumers arrive at different times, so firms can set different prices to
each cohort of consumers. In our model all consumers are present from the beginning, but we allow the
incumbent to limit the number of consumers it sells to in the initial stage thereby making the number
of second-stage consumers endogenous.2 By attracting a group of consumers at a low price to purchase
first (or commit to purchase), the incumbent induces the remaining consumers to buy the incumbent’s
product in the competition stage, even if, other things equal, the entrant’s network is more desirable.
A key difference with Katz and Shapiro’s framework is they assume both firms can make offers at each
stage whereas we allow the incumbent a first-mover advantage in attracting consumers.
Our analysis without multihoming is also related to Jullien (2001) who endogenizes the choice of price
discrimination in markets with network effects, focusing on divide-and-conquer type strategies. He shows
this eliminates any inefficiency that might arise in uniform pricing due to expectations favoring one of the
firms. We consider the polar case, considering the ability of an incumbent to use its first-mover advantage
to block sales by a rival firm that may otherwise have an advantage due to its more desirable network
when expectations are neutral.
None of these models of network effects allow for the possibility that consumers may buy from both
firms, and therefore the incentive firms may have to use exclusivity in their “exclusive deals” to rule out the
possibility of multihoming. Recently, Armstrong and Wright (2006) have considered this aspect but in the
context of a symmetric competition game in a two-sided market. Instead, we have the incumbent making
2In the analysis of two-sided markets, the two groups (buyers and sellers) are exogenously determined. However, unlike
Katz and Shapiro, both are present from the start.
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its offers first, before competing with the entrant. Another important difference is the expectations
assumed. Armstrong and Wright adopt expectations that afford platforms with considerable market
power. Thus, in the absence of exclusive deals they find a competitive bottleneck equilibrium whereas we
obtain an equilibrium more akin to the usual Bertrand competition outcome. These differences explain
why they find that exclusive deals may promote efficiency, whereas we obtain the opposite result. Finally,
we consider both one-sided and two-sided markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our basic framework. Subsequent
sections consider the case of a one-sided market where multihoming is not feasible (Section 3), the case of
a one-sided network where multihoming is feasible (Section 4), and the case of a two-sided market where
multihoming is feasible (Section 5). Section 6 contains some brief conclusions.
2 The basic model and preliminaries
There are a continuum of consumers with mass normalized to one. Two firms, an incumbent I and an
entrant E, can produce a network good, each at a cost of c ≥ 0 per unit sold. The incumbent’s price
is denoted p while the entrant’s price is denoted q. Suppose NI consumers buy exclusively from I, NE
consumers buy exclusively from E, and the remaining 1−NI−NE consumers multihome. Then consumers
are assumed to get net utility v + β (1−NE) − p buying from I only, v + (α+ β) (1−NI) − q buying
from E only, and v+α (1−NI)+β−p−q if they multihome. Utility is increasing in the number of other
consumers buying the same good, but consumers may also get a stand alone benefit v from purchasing
which satisfies v ≥ c. We assume α > 0 and β > 0, so that network effects are positive for both firms
and higher for E than I. Due to positive network effects, efficiency is highest when all consumers buy
from the same firm, and from a welfare perspective this should be the entrant. There is no horizontal
differentiation between the firms.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, I makes an initial offer to a set of the
consumers. Viewing this offer, consumers decide whether to accept the offer or not. Then in the second
stage, I and E compete in prices. We have in mind a situation where two rivals are introducing a
new network product that has already been developed, but that one firm has a headstart in reaching
the market. (As an extension, we consider how our results change when E also faces a fixed entry cost.)
Observing the number of consumers that have accepted offers from I in stage 1, the remaining unattached
consumers then decide which firm to buy from given these prices. We assume initially that consumers
cannot multihome but relax the assumption in Sections 4 and 5.
We denote (generically) I’s price in stage 1 with pX and the corresponding number of consumers
accepting its offer nX . Consumers who receive an offer in stage 1 have the choice of buying from I in
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stage 1 at pX , or buying from either I or E in stage 2 at prices p and q. Thus, in the absence of a
multihoming possibility, the initial offer can be given the interpretation of an exclusive deal with a price
commitment, since it may be that the product is not actually consumed until stage 2. This is why we
write pX for the price in stage 1. To start with we assume firms can only set a single price in a given
stage. However, a form of price discrimination is allowed, in that the incumbent can limit the number of
consumers that can take up its first stage offer, which it could do with an introductory offer (say, using
a first-come first-served rule).3
The model can be interpreted either as one in which I makes an introductory offer to preempt or
influence the nature of any subsequent competition, or that I signs up consumers through exclusive deals
to the same effect. However, given we subsequently allow for multihoming, we distinguish these two types
of offers. Stage 1 offers require consumers to buy (or commit to buy) I’s product and are referred to as
introductory offers. When offers, at either stage, also require the consumers to commit not to buy from
the rival firm, they are referred to as exclusive deals. Introductory offers may or may not be exclusive
deals, while exclusive deals may be offered by I and E in stage 2 (as well as by I in stage 1), if allowed.
As is well known in competition games with pure network effects, there may be multiple consistent
demand configurations for a given set of prices offered by firms. For instance, if all consumers are expected
to buy from I in stage 2 then I can attract all demand at a higher price than E. However, at these
prices, all consumers buying from E is also an equilibrium, say if consumers all buy from the cheapest
firm. Given network effects, the number of consumers that buy from I in stage 1 can influence this set of
equilibria in stage 2. Moreover, for given prices in stage 1 and expectations about the equilibrium played
in stage 2, there can also be multiple equilibrium configurations in stage 1 depending on what consumers
expect others to do in stage 1. This means often a unique demand function is not defined at either stage,
and some rule is needed to select a unique demand configuration.
There are three commonly used rules from the literature on network effects. These are often referred
to as rules about how consumers form expectations.4 The three are: (1) expectations (stubbornly) favor
firm I; (2) expectations (stubbornly) favor firm E; and (3) expectations are based on maximal surplus.
More precisely, the rules correspond to: (1) select the equilibrium demand configuration at each stage
which has the highest demand for firm I (and of these, the lowest demand for firm E) where demand
refers to the demand from those consumers choosing between the firms; (2) the same as (1) but with
I and E switched; and (3) select the equilibrium demand configuration at each point which has the
3If new consumers are allowed to enter in stage 2, then such limited offers would not be necessary to obtain our qualitative
results provided there are not too many new consumers for the entrant to attract. However, the incumbent may still do
better by limiting the number of consumers receiving offers in the first stage.
4See Farrell and Klemperer (2006) for a discussion of the relevant literature and different rules to describe consumer
expectations.
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highest joint surplus for those consumers choosing between the firms. Regardless of the rule used, all
equilibria are subgame perfect. Throughout we will focus on the third rule since it minimizes the scope
for coordination failures amongst those consumers making decisions at each stage. Thus, our analysis is
not as vulnerable to the criticism sometimes leveled at the naked exclusion literature, that it relies on
consumers receiving offers not being able to coordinate on the right equilibrium. In the competition stage,
these beliefs also provide the closest analogy to the homogenous Bertrand competition assumed in the
existing naked exclusion literature. We will refer to this rule as consumers being “optimal coordinators”.
Finally, since there is no natural tie-breaking rule when consumers are optimal coordinators, we
adopt the standard approach of using whichever rule is necessary to avoid open set problems in defining
equilibria. For instance, if consumers are indifferent between buying from I and E at the prices p = c
and q = c + α, we assume consumers will buy from E since if not, E could set a slightly lower price to
attract the consumers, obtaining almost the same profit (note I cannot profitably do the same thing).
Where there is no such open set problem in defining equilibria, as would be the case in the above example
if α = 0, we assume indifferent consumers choose E over I, choose to buy from a single firm rather than
to multihome, and to buy from at least one firm rather than not buy at all.
3 Results with singlehoming
In this section, we consider one-sided networks and assume that multihoming, whereby consumers can
buy from both firms in order to obtain maximal network benefits, is not allowed. Whether multihoming
is possible or not, may come down to technical considerations. In some cases it may not be practical for
consumers to multihome (for instance, most consumers would not consider running two seperate operating
systems such as Linux and Microsoft Windows). In other cases, it may be prohibitively expensive to do
so, which will be the case if c is sufficiently large.5
Before turning to our main analysis, consider first what happens when consumers’ beliefs instead
follow one of the other two rules noted above. If consumers stubbornly prefer buying from I, then its
ability to make introductory offers will play no role given it already enjoys expectations that stubbornly
favor it and can already extract all of consumers’ network benefits from buying from it. The analysis
of introductory offers is not interesting under such beliefs. Alternatively, if expectations favor E, then
E has considerable market power since in the absence of introductory offers it will extract all of users’
network benefits. It can be shown that I can continue to use similar types of offers as those studied
below in stage 1 to attract all demand, but that unlike the analysis below, this will lead to an increase
in consumer surplus. This reflects that I’s ability to use introductory offers in stage 1 helps offset E’s
5Clearly a sufficient condition is that 2c > v + α + β, so that even when consumers only pay the cost of buying from
each firm (which is necessary for the firms to break even), the consumers’ net surplus is negative.
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market power in stage 2, leading to more symmetric competition and lower prices. This is a similar effect
to the one studied by Jullien (2001). By focusing on consumers that are optimal coordinators we are
ruling out such a situation.
We start by characterizing the equilibrium in the second stage assuming that nX consumers buy from
I in stage 1. Figure 1 displays the different consistent demand configurations in stage 2 given nX , p and
q. Lemma 1 establishes that the points highlighted in Figure 1 represent the equilibria of the stage 2
subgame.
Figure 1 around here.
Lemma 1 Define n1 = α/ (α+ β). If nX > n1, then the incumbent makes all the sales in stage 2 and the
equilibrium prices are given by p = c+ βnX −α (1− nX) and q = c. If on the other hand, nX ≤ n1, then
the entrant makes all the sales in stage 2 and equilibrium prices are p = c and q = c+α (1− nX)−βnX .
Proof. As is illustrated in figure 1, provided p ≤ β there is a consistent demand configuration in which all
unattached consumers buy from I in stage 2, denoted configuration I, and provided q ≤ (α+ β) (1− nX)
there is a consistent demand configuration in which all unattached consumers buy from E, denoted
configuration E. (We indicate the region of prices where no one joins either platform as configuration
Ø). Subject to prices being in the range where both configurations I and E apply, optimal coordination
by consumers implies they will buy from I in stage 2 if p < q + βnX − α (1− nX), will buy from E if
p > q+βnX −α (1− nX), and are indifferent if p = q+βnX −α (1− nX). Provided that nX > n1, I can
charge a price at least as high as E and still get all the consumers. As competition forces E’s price to
cost, the equilibrium is obtained when p = c+βnX−α (1− nX) > c and q = c, with all consumers buying
from I. On the other hand, whenever nX < n1, E can charge a price that is higher than I’s and still serve
all the free consumers. In this case, equilibrium is established, when p = c and q = c+α (1− nX)−βnX
with all free consumers buying from E. Finally, if nX = n1, then both firms will compete price down to
cost, with all consumers buying from E given our tie-breaking assumption.
The critical value of nX defined in Lemma 1 is the value at which β = (α+ β) (1− nX). For higher
nX , consumers get lower network benefits joining E than joining I. For lower nX , E offers greater
network benefits even though it has nX fewer consumers. Whichever firm offers greater total network
benefits captures all remaining demand in stage 2. Thus, by signing up enough consumers in stage 1,
I can reduce the network benefits of E’s network to the point that it more than offsets E’s intrinsic
advantage. The remaining consumers then prefer to join I over E. If E’s advantage measured by α is
large, then I has to sign up a large proportion of consumers to achieve this point.
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Next we turn to stage 1. So as to attract any consumers at stage 1, the incumbent must offer them
at least v − c+ β which is what they can obtain waiting till stage 2 and enjoying competition between I
and E. Bertrand-type competition means the entrant is only able to extract α, its network advantage.
Thus, consumers will only accept an offer in stage 1 if pX < c. This leaves I with a loss in stage 1. Thus,
it will not offer any introductory offer unless it can make some profit on consumers in stage 2. This
implies it will not want to make an introductory offer to all consumers in stage 1 since then there will
be no consumers left to exploit in stage 2. If I is not allowed to limit the number of consumers receiving
its first-stage offers, this provides a benchmark result in which no one signs with I, E makes all sales in
stage 2 at a price of q = c + α and consumers are left with a total surplus of CS0 = v − c + β.
6 Since
α > 0, this is the first-best outcome.
The incumbent can make a positive profit by restricting the number of consumers that can sign up
in stage 1.
Proposition 1 If consumers are optimal coordinators and the incumbent can limit the number of con-
sumers buying in stage 1, nX = 1/2+α/ (2α+ 2β) consumers will buy from the incumbent in stage 1 at
the price of pX = c, and the rest of the consumers will buy from the incumbent in stage 2 at the price
p = c+ β/2. The entrant makes no sales. The outcome is inefficient, with consumer surplus lower than
in the benchmark case without introductory offers.
Proof. The incumbent sets a price pX to nX consumers in stage 1. If they all reject, the second stage
equilibrium implies all consumers get utility of v−c+β buying from the entrant (I then gets zero profit).
If instead the nX consumers accept the offer, they get v−pX+β buying from I, provided nX > n1 so that
from Lemma 1 the incumbent will sell to all the remaining consumers in stage 2. Thus, I can attract the
nX consumers with minimal loss by setting pX = c. This gives it a profit of (βnX − α (1− nX)) (1− nX),
which is maximized by choosing nX = 1/2+α/ (2α+ 2β) > 1/2 which also satisfies nX > n1. The profit
of I following this strategy is given by
piI =
β2
4 (α+ β)
> 0. (1)
This is an inefficient outcome given α > 0. Moreover, all consumers would be better off if introductory
offers were eliminated. Compared to the benchmark without introductory offers in which consumer
surplus is v− c+ β, consumers who receive the introductory offer get the same surplus while the surplus
of those that miss out is lower by β/2. Total consumer surplus is
CS1 = v − c+
(
4α+ 3β
4α+ 4β
)
β < CS0.
6A similar result holds even with growing markets, provided there are more than β/ (α+ β) new consumers in stage 2.
With only a limited (but positive) number of new consumers in stage 2, Lemma 1 implies the incumbent could profitably
use an introductory offer even if the offer has to made to all stage 1 consumers.
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Proposition 1 shows the incumbent will prevent the efficient entrant making any sales by selling the
product to a majority of consumers at cost in the first stage via introductory offers. In fact, it will sign
up more than the minimum number of consumers necessary to do so. This allows the incumbent to
further raise the willingness to pay from the remaining minority of consumers, making maximum profits
in stage 2 by charging a high price to them. To achieve this outcome the incumbent has to compensate
the consumers that sign for the lower network benefits they get from its inferior network. Although
consumers pay a lower price in stage 1, they obtain exactly the same surplus they would have if they
bought from the more efficient entrant. Nevertheless, the consumers who buy in stage 2 are hurt and
lose β/2 each. This loss aggregated over second stage buyers is transferred to the incumbent as profits
as defined in (1).
While the pricing in Proposition 1 is easy to implement, the incumbent can do even better if it is
able to discriminate between individual consumers in stage 1. Such fully discriminatory contracts with
externalities have been studied by Segal (2003). To demonstrate how powerful such price discrimination
can be, consider the extreme case where the incumbent can make sequential offers to consumers in the
first stage, with each offer in the sequence depending on the uptake of previous offers. That is, suppose
the incumbent can order consumers and make a sequence of offers, one to each consumer in turn in stage
1. The second stage is modelled as before.
Following the same logic as Segal and Whinston (2000), the incumbent will then be able to attract
all consumers at almost the same price as if it enjoys favorable expectations, namely at pX = c + β.
The first consumer that is made an offer knows that if it rejects, I has a feasible strategy to convince all
the remaining consumers to accept its offer. Thus, the first consumer is willing to pay almost c + β to
sign. In general, assume that incumbent orders the consumers by a variable t ∈ [0, 1] in an arbitrary way
and consider the pricing function of the incumbent for the consumer at t, when y preceding consumers
have already accepted the deal that is given by pX(t, y) = max(c, c − α + (α+ β) (1 + y − t)). It can be
verified that this ensures all consumers agree to sign with the incumbent and gives it the same profits as
if expectations favored it. Thus, when sophisticated deals can be made, consumers are left with just the
stand-alone surplus v − c.
If consumer surplus is weighted more highly than profits (e.g. to capture that demand is elastic in
practice), this is the least desirable outcome from a welfare perspective. However, such complicated
sequential contracts seem unrealistic in most applications. Instead we restrict attention to simple limited
offers in what follows since (i) this setting captures similar insights to those obtained without limited
offers but allowing for some new consumers to arrive in stage 2; (ii) it would anyway be hard to prevent
the incumbent make such introductory offers (say on a first-come first-served basis) as in Proposition 1;
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and (iii) this setting also captures the key insights obtained by analyzing more sophisticated forms of
price discrimination.
3.1 Fixed costs of entry
Before turning to allow for multihoming we consider one important extension of the analysis above. Our
analysis up to this point has assumed that the entrant has no fixed costs of entry. As noted earlier, this
can be interpreted as both firms having already developed the product, but that one firm (the incumbent)
has a headstart in reaching the market (that is, doing deals with consumers). An alternative situation of
interest is that the incumbent also has a headstart in developing the product, so that the entrant has to
decide whether to incur fixed entry costs (such as product development costs) after the incumbent has
already had a chance to sign up consumers. The fact that the entrant may be absent in the second stage
will not only alter the behavior of the incumbent in the second stage, but also influence its design of its
introductory offers in the first stage.
Formally, we can add an additional (intermediate) period between stage 1 and stage 2 in which E
decides whether to enter or not. We assume that entry is costly so that E has to incur a positive fixed cost
of entry, denoted by F . In addition, we restrict our attention to the case where 0 < F < α which ensures
that the efficient outcome would involve entry. Otherwise the model is exactly the same as described in
section 2.
Provided entry occurs, the results obtained in Lemma 1 for the second stage equilibria when consumers
are optimal coordinators continue to apply. On the other hand, if E does not enter, I will have a monopoly
which means it will extract all consumer surplus. Specifically, I charges the monopoly price p = v + β
and makes sales to all the remaining consumers in stage 2.
Given that E has to incur fixed costs of F and nX people are already committed to buy from I, the
following lemma characterizes E’s optimal entry decision.
Lemma 2 If nX consumers have signed an introductory offer in stage 1, in the presence of a fixed entry
cost F , entry will takes place if and only if
nX < n1 −
√
β2 + 4 (α+ β)F − β
2 (α+ β)
= n2 < n1.
Proof. Entry will occur if and only if E is able to make sufficient sales in the second period to cover its
fixed costs in stage 1. With entry, its profit is (1− nX)(α(1 − nX)− βnX)− F , which is positive if and
only if nX < n2.
In the absence of limited offers in stage 1, the incumbent either has to offer a bribe to all consumers to
get them to buy (compensating them for its lower network benefits) or attract no consumers at all. Since
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offering a bribe to all consumers is not profitable, the incumbent cannot exploit the fact that the entrant
needs to attain a minimum scale. This reflects that consumers are optimal coordinators, so the buyer
mis-coordination of Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) does not apply. Instead, the
entrant makes all sales in stage 2 at a price of q = c+ α, leaving consumers with the surplus v − c+ β,
and the outcome is efficient. In contrast, if the incumbent can limit its offers in stage 1, it can easily
block entry by bribing sufficiently many consumers in the first stage.
Proposition 2 If consumers are optimal coordinators and the incumbent can limit the number of con-
sumers buying in stage 1, in the presence of a fixed entry cost F , nX = n2 consumers will buy from the
incumbent in stage 1 at the price of pX = c, and the rest of the consumers will buy from the incumbent
in stage 2 at the monopoly price p = v + β. Entry is inefficiently foreclosed with consumer surplus lower
than in the benchmark case without introductory offers.
Proof. The incumbent needs to sell to at least n2 consumers to block the entry of the rival firm.
Any consumer in the first stage would accept I’s offer if pX = c. This implies aggregate profits of
(1 − nX)(v − c + β), which is a decreasing function of nX . Hence, I makes its introductory offers to
the smallest number of consumers necessary to deter entry; that is, n∗X = n2. This gives I a monopoly
position in stage 2, so it sells to the remaining 1 − n2 consumers at the monopoly price p = v + β. Its
profit is
piI = (1− n2) (v − c+ β) .
Since α > 0, the foreclosure of entry here is inefficient. Moreover, all consumers would be better off
if these limited introductory offers were eliminated, in which consumer surplus is v − c + β. Compared
to this benchmark, consumers who sign an exclusive deal get the same surplus while the surplus of those
that miss out is lower by the full amount v − c+ β (they get no surplus). Total consumer surplus is
CS2 = n2 (v − c+ β) < CS0.
Compared to the case without fixed costs, the incumbent now signs up fewer consumers. Rather than
having to bribe enough consumers in stage 1 so as to be able to attract remaining consumers in stage 2
despite competition with a more desirable entrant, now the incumbent just has to focus on signing up
enough consumers to deny the entrant enough profit in stage 2 to cover its fixed cost of entry. Thus, the
point of signing up consumers in stage 1 is to reduce the demand for the entrant’s product in stage 2,
thereby denying it the sufficient scale to recover its fixed costs. This is like the standard naked exclusion
story without network effects, but network effects magnify the effect of the reduction in demand for the
entrant’s product.
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An interesting feature of the result above is that even if the fixed entry cost is very close to zero, the
existence of such fixed costs can still matter a lot for the profitability of the incumbent’s introductory
offers. By deterring entry, the incumbent gains a monopoly position in the second stage, which it can
exploit by charging the remaining consumers the full amount of their surplus v + β. Previously it could
only charge them c + β/2. Small entry costs can therefore amplify the impact of introductory offers or
exclusive deals when there are network effects. Equivalently, consistent with the conjecture of Shapiro
(1999), the entry deterring effects of fixed cost in the standard naked exclusion story are magnified by
network effects, making them more powerful barriers to entry.
4 Multihoming in one-sided markets
In this section, the possibility that the consumers can buy from both firms in order to obtain greater
network benefits is considered. This type of behavior is commonly referred to as “multihoming”. The
implications of multihoming in one and two-sided markets is studied by among others, Armstrong (2006),
Armstrong and Wright (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Doganoglu and Wright (2006) and Rochet
and Tirole (2003). When consumers multihome they are able to get the network benefits corresponding
to interacting with users that can be reached from either network. The rest of the model remains the
same, except we assume v = c = 0 for simplicity. Provided costs are low enough that multihoming is
always a relevant option, the same qualitative results can be obtained allowing for small but positive
values of v > c > 0.
There are two types of multihoming in our setting. First, attached consumers that join with I in
stage 1 may also want to join E in stage 2. Second, unattached consumers may want to join both I and
E in stage 2. Exclusive deals may be used at either stage to rule out multihoming. Exclusive offers just
involve an exclusivity condition in which consumers purchasing agree not to also purchase from the rival.
For example, the entrant can make its offers exclusive in stage 2, so that unattached consumers have to
either buy from it or the incumbent, but cannot multihome. Similarly, the incumbent may make its offer
exclusive in stage 1 (or stage 2) so as to prevent consumers buying from the entrant if they accept its
offer. Notice as soon as one firm makes its offers exclusive, it rules out consumers multihoming and so
the other firm’s offer is also, in effect, exclusive.
To provide a benchmark for the effects of exclusive dealing, we first explore what happens when firms
cannot offer such contracts to prevent consumers from multihoming. Thus, even if some consumers sign
with the incumbent in stage 1, they still have the possibility of also buying from the entrant in stage 2.
This is the relevant alternative if exclusive deals are banned.
Proposition 3 When neither firm can offer exclusive deals at either stage, then no one buys from the
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incumbent in stage 1; in stage 2 they all buy, but only from the entrant. This is true even if the incumbent
can limit the number of consumers who can obtain its first stage offers. The outcome is efficient.
Proof. We first show that in equilibrium, all unattached consumers buy only from E, while those
consumers who have bought from I multihome, buying also from E in stage 2. This then means I cannot
obtain any profit from unattached consumers in stage 2, and since it can only attract consumers in stage
1 at a loss, it will choose not to make any such offers.
Assume that nX > 0 consumers have accepted a non-exclusive offer from I in stage 1. We first
characterize the demand as a function of both prices, and then determine the equilibrium prices in stage
2. We restrict to non-negative prices given a negative price will imply a firm makes a loss in stage 2. There
are five different regions of consistent demand configurations: (i) unattached buy from I and attached do
not buy from E (configuration I) when p ≤ β; (ii) unattached buy from E and attached also buy from E
(configuration E) when q ≤ α+ β (1− nX); (iii) unattached multihome and attached do not buy from E
when p ≤ βnX and q = α (1− nX); (iv) unattached buy from E and attached do not buy from E when
p = βnX and q = (α+ β) (1− nX); and (v) no one buys from either firm in stage 2 (configuration Ø)
when p > βnX and q > 0
The configurations in (iii) and (iv) can be eliminated using the expectation rule that consumers
coordinate on the configuration which gives them highest joint surplus. Both configurations I and E
remain when p ≤ β and q ≤ α + β (1− nX). The expectation rule implies configuration E arises
if q ≤ α + (1 − nX)p and otherwise configuration I arises. If p > β and q > α + β (1− nX) then
configuration Ø is the only consistent demand configuration. This defines demand uniquely for any given
prices. We present how demand varies with prices in Figure 2.
Now consider a possible equilibrium in stage 2. Any equilibrium must involve configuration E being
played. To see why note that at any point in configuration Ø, either firm has an incentive to lower its
price, obtaining positive demand and profit. At any point in configuration I, the entrant can lower its
price to move to configuration E and obtain a positive profit. Moreover, E cannot charge above α in
equilibrium, otherwise I can always lower its price to move to configuration I, obtaining positive demand
and profit. However, for any price p > 0, E has an incentive to increase its price above α. Thus, the
unique equilibrium (given our expectation rule) arises when p = 0 and q = α, with E attracting all
consumers in stage 2. (Note, if I sets a negative price, it will induce consumers to multihome but will
make a loss from doing so.) In this proposed equilibrium, I makes no profit in stage 2 and E’s profit is
α.
Now consider consumers deciding whether to buy from I in stage 1. If they do not do so they know
from above they can get a surplus of β buying from E in stage 2. The best each consumer can do buying
from I is if they all do so, which will only make them better off if pX < 0. However, this implies a loss
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for I, and so it will not make such an offer and no one will buy from I in either stage.
Figure 2 around here.
Proposition 3 shows that the entrant, with its more desirable network, can overcome an installed base
advantage of the incumbent. The ability of users to multihome plays an important role here. No matter
how many consumers buy from the incumbent in the first stage, in stage 2 they will want to also buy from
the entrant given it offers greater network benefits. The unattached consumers have the same preference.
By doing so they can obtain some additional network benefits. Moreover, provided the costs of attracting
each consumer is low enough (here it is assumed to be zero), the entrant can profitably sell to these
additional consumers. Hence, the incumbent cannot make a positive profit from competition with the
entrant in the second stage. This in turn means there is no way in stage 2 to take advantage of signing
up consumers in stage 1. It also means consumers will not pay anything to buy from the incumbent in
stage 1.
Proposition 3 provides a benchmark with which to compare the effects of exclusive deals. The bench-
mark involves a competitive and efficient outcome. This is in contrast to our findings with singlehoming
in which limited offers in stage 1 were enough for the incumbent to inefficiently take the whole market.
We now turn to our main result — the case where firms can employ exclusive deals. These allow the
firms to make their offers conditional on consumers not buying from their rival.
Proposition 4 When firms can employ exclusive deals, and the incumbent can limit the number of con-
sumers who can obtain its first stage offers, the incumbent will always use exclusive first stage offers. The
incumbent signs up one half of the consumers exclusively in stage 1, with the remaining half multihoming
in stage 2. A ban on exclusive deals increases consumer surplus and welfare.
Proof. The proof is long, so we present it in four steps. The first step involves characterizing the second
stage equilibrium assuming I attracts no buyers or sellers in the first stage. The second step involves doing
the same thing assuming I attracts some consumers exclusively in stage 1. It turns out there are then two
equilibria in stage 2, and so this step also involves determining which equilibrium will be selected. Having
done this, we know what agents will need to be offered to be willing to accept an exclusive deal in stage
1, and so determine the optimal exclusive offer by I in stage 1. The third step involves showing I does
not want to offer a non-exclusive deal in stage 1 instead. Finally, step four concludes by summarizing
the implications of the resulting equilibrium.
1. Stage 2 equilibria when no one signs in stage 1.
If no one signs in stage 1, then we know by the same logic as used in the proof of Proposition 3, in
stage 2 E will attract all users at the price q = α. That logic did not rely on unattached consumers
multihoming in stage 2, so exclusive deals play no role in this case.
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2. Equilibrium when some consumers sign exclusively with I in stage 1.
Suppose I makes an exclusive offer to nX consumers in stage 1. If consumers do not accept the offer,
they all end up buying from E in the second stage to obtain a surplus of β as in step one. Therefore,
to get consumers to accept its exclusive offers in stage 1, I has to offer them at least this surplus. Its
most profitable option is to sign them up exclusively at the price pX = 0 in stage 1, assuming it signs up
enough consumers that the remaining consumers will all buy from I in stage 2 at a positive price (they
may also multihome).
Now consider the second stage equilibrium analysis. There are four possible stage 2 equilibria: (i)
firms both offer exclusive deals; (ii) neither firm offers exclusive deals; (iii) I makes a non-exclusive offer
while E makes an exclusive offer; and (iv) I makes an exclusive offer while E makes a non-exclusive
offer. It is straightforward to show (iii) and (iv) are not equilibria, since the firm which makes its offer
exclusive can always profitably deviate making its offer non-exclusive to extract some more surplus from
the consumers by allowing them to multihome. We proceed to characterize the possible equilibria arising
in the subgames characterized by (i) and (ii).
(i) When first stage consumers sign exclusive deals, and firms make their offer exclusive in stage
2, no firm can do better by making their offers non-exclusive given consumers cannot multihome when
the other firm’s offers remain exclusive. The competition game becomes exactly as the one analyzed
in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. This implies the optimal number of consumers signed will be n∗X =
1/2 + α/ (2(α+ β)) > n1. This yields I the profits as given in (1).
(ii) Consider the possibility there is an equilibrium in stage 2 in which neither firm makes its offers
an exclusive one. Since only unattached consumers have a choice to make in stage 2, there are only
four possible consistent demand configurations: unattached consumers multihoming (configuration M)
if p ≤ βnX and q ≤ α(1 − nX); unattached consumers buy from I (configuration I) if p ≤ β and
q ≥ 0; unattached consumers buy from E (configuration E) if p ≥ βnX and q ≤ (α + β)(1 − nX);
unattached consumers do not buy from either firm (configuration Ø) when p > βnX and q > 0. Using
our expectations rule, we select the configuration which maximizes the joint surplus of those consumers
making a choice, in this case, the unattached consumers. The selected configurations are illustrated in
Figure (3) for given prices, which defines demand uniquely.
Given these demands it is straightforward to see from Figure (3) that the unique non-exclusive pricing
equilibrium in the second stage arises when p = βnX and q = α(1 − nX). At these prices and given
unattached consumers multihome, if either firm sets a lower price, it cannot increase its demand, while if
either firm sets a higher price, it will lose all its demand. At any other set of prices in the multihoming
region, each firm has an incentive to raise its price to this level since it will not lose any demand. At any
other set of prices outside the multihoming region, one of the firms always has an incentive to lower its
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price until it either obtains all the demand, or moves inside the multihoming region. Moreover, neither
firm can do better making an exclusive offer in stage 2, since if either firm raises its price it will lose
all demand from unattached consumers. The incumbent’s profit is therefore βnX (1− nX) , which is
maximized by offering exclusive deals to nX = 1/2 of consumers in stage 1. In this equilibrium, the
incumbent obtains a profit of β/4.
Provided I offers exclusive deals in stage 1 so that nX > α/ (α+ β), we have established there are
two second stage equilibria, one where I and E make exclusive offers and one where I and E make
non-exclusive offers. To be precise, we select the equilibrium where the firms make non-exclusive offers
(adopting the other equilibrium has similar implications, as we note below). Regardless of whether I sets
nX = 1/2 or nX = 1/2+α/ (2 (α+ β)) in stage 1, the equilibrium where firms make non-exclusive offers
in stage 2 gives each firm higher profits. Moreover, by choosing nX = 1/2 in stage 1, I can signal it will
play this equilibrium, so that by a forward induction refinement this equilibrium will be selected in stage
2. In other words, I would not set nX = 1/2 if it intended to play the equilibrium with exclusive offers in
stage 2 since it would then have preferred to set a higher nX . (If α > β, so that nX = 1/2 < α/ (α+ β),
then the equilibrium where firms make non-exclusive offers in stage 2 is unique and the forward induction
refinement is not needed.)
3. The incumbent cannot do better signing consumers non-exclusively in stage 1.
From Proposition 3, we know if I uses introductory rather than exclusive deals in stage 1, then in
stage 2 E will attract all users at the price q = α. This result remains true even if firms can make their
offers exclusive in stage 2. This is because E will prefer to leave its offer non-exclusive in stage 2, since
otherwise consumers who sign (non-exclusively) with I in stage 1 will not be able to buy from it in stage
2. Moreover, the logic in Proposition 3 did not rely on unattached consumers multihoming in stage 2,
so exclusive deals cannot profitably be used by I in stage 2 either. Thus, I must make its stage 1 offer
exclusive to make a positive profit.
4. Summary of equilibrium properties.
Compared to the equilibrium in Proposition 3, where exclusive deals were not feasible or not allowed
at either stage, I’s profit increases from zero to β/4 and E’s profit decreases from α to α/4. Previously,
without exclusive deals, all consumers obtain the surplus of β. Now half of them get the same surplus
(those signing the exclusive deal in stage 1) and the other half (that are not offered the exclusive deal in
stage 1) get a surplus of only β/2. As a result of exclusive deals, consumer surplus is lower by β/4 and
welfare is lower by 3α/4.
Figure 3 somewhere here.
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Proposition 4 shows that offering exclusive deals is an effective way for the incumbent to maintain
dominance even though it offers a less desirable network and even though consumers are optimal co-
ordinators. By signing up some consumers exclusively in stage 1, the incumbent causes the remaining
consumers to multihome in stage 2. They multihome so as to reach the consumers who are exclusively on
the incumbent’s network and so as to take advantage of the entrant’s more desirable network. However,
firms do not have to compete for multihoming consumers, allowing the incumbent to make a positive
profit in stage 2. The incumbent can extract the full network benefits that the unattached consumers
get from being able to reach the signed consumers. Since there are nX signed consumers and 1 − nX
unattached consumers, and since it obtains no revenue from signed consumers, the incumbent maximizes
its profit βnX (1− nX) by signing half of the consumers and exploiting the other half.
The more efficient entrant is partially foreclosed from the market since it cannot sell to the half of
consumers that sign exclusively with the incumbent in stage 1. The outcome is inefficient. Banning
exclusive dealing in stage 1 will restore the efficient outcome. Note that if instead exclusive dealing is
only banned in stage 2, when both firms are already competing head-to-head, then such a ban cannot
restore the efficient outcome. In fact, the equilibrium selected in Proposition 4 does not involve exclusive
dealing in stage 2, so that such a ban would be futile.
Although our foreclosure result is only partial, the degree of foreclosure found would likely be sufficient
for the behavior to be found illegal. In the key Supreme Court decision on exclusivity (Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.), the court emphasized that exclusive dealing should involve a substantial
share of the relevant line of commerce to be considered a restraint of trade (Balto 1999, p.552). Balto
notes “the ultimate issue in an exclusivity case is the degree of foreclosure”. Based on an analysis of
cases, he argues that when exclusive contracts involve less than 30% of the market, no violation is found,
while foreclosure is likely to be sufficient when it is greater than 50%, the degree of foreclosure our model
predicts.
In proving the proposition, a forward induction argument was used to select the equilibria in the
stage 2 subgame in which firms make non-exclusive offers. The same qualitative result holds if instead
firms coordinate on the second stage equilibrium where they make exclusive offers. In fact, in this case
the results are even more striking, since the incumbent will sign up more than half of the consumers
exclusively in stage 1 and take the whole market exclusively in stage 2. The resulting loss in consumer
surplus and welfare is even greater than before.
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5 Two-sided markets
In this section, we extend the previous framework to analyze exclusive dealing in two-sided markets. Many
of the network markets where exclusive dealing applies are actually two-sided markets. An important set
of examples is content provision for entertainment or communication platforms such as Pay-TV, video-
games and 3G mobile telephony. The use of exclusive deals by Nintendo was noted in the introduction.
By having games exclusively on its platform, Nintendo could then attract consumers more effectively.
A similar case arises for Pay-TV. (A recent example from the Singaporean Pay-TV market is discussed
below).
Another reason for looking specifically at two-sided markets is the unique features that make the
analysis of exclusive dealing in two-sided markets somewhat different to that of one-sided markets. We
note three such features. In two-sided markets, users divide into two groups, so there is a natural way for
platforms to price discriminate between the two groups of users even if they cannot discriminate between
users of the same type. Moreover, rather than endogenously determining a subset of users which receive
low price offers in stage 1 as in our one-sided setting, where we allowed the incumbent to make limited
offers, here we have two groups of users determined exogenously by their types (for example, buyers
and sellers). Finally, it is reasonable to assume platforms can only offer exclusive deals to one of the
two sides. This seems likely to be the case if one side represents individual consumers while the other
represents firms. It is typically not feasible for platforms to monitor and enforce exclusivity contracts
with households but they may be able to do so with firms. For example, Nintendo could not prevent
individuals from buying Sega’s Genesis console but it could require game developers to only produce their
games for its platform. We therefore assume exclusive deals can only be made on the seller side.7
Our analysis of exclusive dealing in two-sided markets can be compared to the analysis in Armstrong
and Wright (2006), where exclusive dealing is explored as a way of overcoming a competitive bottleneck
equilibrium. Caillaud and Julien (2001) also consider an equilibrium where agents can only join platforms
exclusively and in which one platform is dominant, although they do not consider whether platforms will
adopt exclusivity. Our analysis differs from these papers since, like standard models of naked exclusion
such as Segal and Whinston (2000), we allow the incumbent to sign up agents first, while introducing
an advantage to the entrant in any subsequent competition. Our paper also differs in the expectations
assumed. As in the one-sided case, we assume agents deciding between platforms are optimal coordinators,
so that we reduce the scope for coordination failures on the part of agents.
The previous model is extended to one in which there are two types of agents, denoted B and S, which
7We have also analyzed a version of the model assuming platforms can offer exclusive deals on both sides. The qualitative
results are similar to those below, except that sellers no longer benefit as much from exclusive deals, with the incumbent
benefiting more instead.
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we will refer to generically as buyers and sellers. Each type values the number of agents of the opposite
type it can interact with but not the number of the same type. The measure of buyers is set to one, as is
the measure of sellers. Denote I’s prices by pB and pS , and E’s prices by qB and qS . As in the previous
section, stand-alone benefits and costs are set to zero. Suppose NI sellers join I exclusively, NE sellers
join E exclusively, and the remaining 1−NI −NE sellers multihome. Then buyers get βB (1−NE)− pB
joining I only, (αB + βB) (1−NI)−qB joining E only, and αB (1−NI)+βB−pB−qB if they multihome.
The sellers’ benefits can be defined in a symmetric fashion.
All other assumptions are the same as in the benchmark model of Section 2. In particular, I gets
to make its offers in stage 1, and both platforms then compete for any remaining users in stage 2. We
continue to focus on the setting in which agents are optimal coordinators, so where there are multiple
equilibrium demand configurations for given prices, we select the equilibrium demand configuration at
each point which has the highest joint surplus for those agents deciding about which platform(s) to join.
Finally, as in our one-sided setting of Section 4, we allow multihoming and first consider the case in which
platforms cannot make their offers exclusive (say because exclusive dealing is banned) and then allow
them to make such offers.
Proposition 5 If platforms cannot discriminate amongst users of the same type and cannot make their
offers exclusive at either stage, then no one will join the incumbent, and all buyers and sellers will join
the entrant’s platform in stage 2. The outcome is efficient.
Proof. First, suppose I attracts neither side in stage 1. The best I can offer users in stage 2 to compete
with E will satisfy pB+pS = 0, so that I at least breaks even. Since I does not want to induce unprofitable
multihoming, the best it can offer is then to set pB = pS = 0. It follows that the only equilibrium in
stage 2 involves qB = αB and qS = αS , with all agents joining E only. If E were to charge more to one
side, I would have a profitable divide-and-conquer strategy attracting the other side with a bribe. If I
were to charge more in total, then E would want to increase its charge to at least one of the sides. In
this equilibrium I makes no profit and E makes a profit of αB + αS .
Suppose instead I makes an introductory offer to all sellers in stage 1. If they believe it will attract
all buyers in stage 2, I must offer sellers more surplus than they can get if they reject the offer, in which
case they get βS from E. So I can only attract sellers in stage 1 by charging pS < 0. A symmetric result
holds for attracting buyers. Moreover, in any stage 2 equilibrium, both buyers and sellers will always join
E’s platform given there is no cost to E of selling to them and doing so gives them additional network
benefits over joining only I’s network. As a result, I cannot extract any surplus from agents in stage 2
and will make a loss with its introductory offer in stage 1. As a result I will never make such an offer in
the first place. Thus, the equilibrium of the full game is the same as the equilibrium of the subgame in
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which I attracts no users in stage 1, so that E attracts all users at the prices qB = αB and qS = αS in
stage 2.
The implication of the proposition is that absent the ability of firms to offer exclusive deals, the
incumbent does not derive any advantage of being able to move first and attract users in stage 1 with
introductory offers. This reflects that the entrant has a more desirable network and that agents can
multihome, so that even if the incumbent could attract one group in stage 1, the entrant could still
profitably attract both groups in stage 2. Competition is Bertrand-like, with the only profit being the
“efficiency” profit that the entrant earns. Moreover, all agents join the entrant in equilibrium which is
the efficient outcome. In this respect, the proposition is the two-sided equivalent of Proposition 3.8 Now
suppose platforms can offer exclusive deals to sellers.
Proposition 6 If platforms cannot price discriminate amongst agents of the same type, and platforms
can make exclusive offers at either stage (but only to sellers), then in equilibrium sellers sign exclusively
with the incumbent’s platform in stage 1 and buyers have all their surplus exploited. Banning exclusive
dealing increases the surplus of buyers as well as total welfare, while sellers and the incumbent are generally
worse off.
Proof. Consider seperately the two cases (i) βS ≥ βB and (ii) βB > βS .
(i) Suppose no agents sign with I in stage 1. The equilibrium in Proposition 5, in which all agents
join E (only) in stage 2, continues to apply. That is, prices in stage 2 are characterized by pB = 0,
pS = 0, qB = αB and qS = αS . Note E does not have to impose exclusivity on sellers in stage 2 to
achieve this outcome. Moreover, if I tries to deviate by attracting sellers exclusively, it will have to set
pS < qS − (αS + βS). It can then extract pB = βB + min (qB , 0) from buyers. As a result, its profit at
these prices will be βB − βS < 0, so the deviation is not profitable. Sellers corresponding surplus is βS .
Of course, the same equilibrium also holds if E adds an exclusivity condition on sellers. With such a
condition, other equilibria are also possible in stage 2, since E can charge up to βB less to sellers and
corresponding more to buyers without I being able to profitably deviate given to do so it would have to
attract sellers exclusively. All these different stage 2 equilibria imply identical profits for the platforms.
Thus, the range of equilibria in stage 2 (if they do not sign in stage 1) implies sellers’ surplus ranges from
βS to βB + βS .
As a result, to get sellers to accept an exclusive deal in stage 1, their surplus of βS − pS must exceed
their surplus of waiting and receiving between βS and βB + βS (depending on which equilibria is played
8If instead the platforms offer symmetric benefits, then other equilibria are possible. For instance, sellers may multihome
on one side and buyers split between the two platforms on the other side, as in the competitive bottleneck result of Armstrong
and Wright (2006). Interestingly, such equilibria are not possible here since with sellers multihoming, the entrant will always
attract buyers exclusively given it offers superior benefits.
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in stage 2). This requires the first stage price pS to be between −βB and 0. Since I extracts all of the
buyers’ surplus in stage 2, it is willing to offer such an exclusive deal in stage 1. This gives I a profit of
between 0 and βB. The resulting outcome is inefficient as both sides should join E’s platform instead.
Previously buyers obtained a surplus of βB and sellers a surplus of βS . Now buyers obtain no surplus
while sellers get at least as much (possibly more) surplus than before.
(ii) Suppose no agents sign with I in stage 1. If βB > βS , then the stage 2 equilibrium in Proposition
5 characterized by the prices pB = 0, pS = 0, qB = αB and qS = αS no longer applies. I can bribe
sellers with the offer pS = −βS if they join exclusively, and then extract all of the buyers’ network benefit
βB. The resulting profit is βB − βS > 0. To prevent I using such a divide-and-conquer strategy in
stage 2, E will charge sellers qS ≤ αS + βS − βB − min (qB, 0) provided they join exclusively. We also
require qS ≤ αS to ensure I cannot profitably attract both sides (getting buyers to multihome with a
small bribe and attracting sellers exclusively with pS < qS − αS). In addition, we require as before
pB + pS = 0 and qB + qS = αB + αS , as well as that pB ≥ 0 (if I offered a negative price to buyers they
would multihome causing it to make a loss) and qB ≤ αB + βB (the buyers’ participation constraints
must be satisfied). Taken together these constraints imply that αB + βB − βS ≤ qB ≤ αB + βB and
αS − βB ≤ qS ≤ αS − (βB − βS). The corresponding seller surplus ranges from βB to βB + βS .
As a result, to get sellers to accept an exclusive deal in stage 1, their surplus of βS − pS must exceed
their surplus of waiting and receiving between βB and βB + βS (depending on which equilibria is played
in stage 2). This requires the first stage price pS to be between −βB and βS − βB. Since I extracts all of
the buyers’ surplus in stage 2, it is willing to offer such an exclusive deal in stage 1. This gives I a profit
of between 0 and βS . The remainder of the proof follows as in (i) except that now sellers are strictly
better off with exclusive deals since their surplus will be at least βB compared to βS < βB before. This
increase in seller surplus comes at the expense of I.
The proposition shows that in a two-sided market where the entrant platform offers a more desirable
network, if the incumbent can sign exclusive deals with sellers prior to facing competition from an entrant,
it will indeed do so. The result is both anticompetitive and inefficient. Here foreclosure is complete, in
the sense the entrant does not sell to either side in equilibrium despite it offering a superior platform.
The incumbent relies on dividing the interests of the two sides. In the first stage, it offers sellers
a deal they cannot refuse. Regardless of what buyers do in stage 1, sellers are better off (or no worse
off) signing exclusively. Sellers know that given they will want to sign exclusively with the incumbent,
buyers will also join the incumbent’s platform — if not in stage 1, then in stage 2. Having signed sellers
exclusively, the incumbent can extract all of the buyers’ surplus. As with one-sided markets, the results
show that it is the exclusive nature of the incumbent’s initial offers that are anticompetitive, not the fact
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it gets sellers on board before the entrant reaches the market. If the incumbent is not able or not allowed
to prevent “sellers” joining both platforms, then the fact that it can make introductory offers does not
help it.
Proposition 6 predicts that it is the incumbent and sellers (e.g. content providers) that benefit from
exclusive deals, while buyers and the entrant are worse off. For instance, it implies that when Nintendo
wrote exclusive deals with developers this benefited Nintendo and the developers at the expense of
consumers and its rivals. The exact distribution of surplus depends on the particular equilibrium that is
expected to be played in the absence of any exclusive deal in the introductory stage. The more aggressively
the incumbent is expected to court sellers in the competition stage, the more surplus the incumbent must
leave with sellers to get them to sign the original exclusive deal. However, the incumbent cannot commit
not to compete aggressively for sellers if it does not sign them initially. It therefore ends up potentially
giving away all its surplus to get sellers to sign in the first place.
The minimum surplus sellers will be left with under exclusive dealing is greater if buyers value sellers
more than vice-versa. Ironically, this results from the incumbent’s ability to use a divide-and-conquer
strategy to attract sellers exclusively, so as to exploit the more lucrative buyers. To prevent the incumbent
using this strategy, the entrant will leave sellers with at least the buyers’ network benefit in the competition
stage. As a result, the incumbent has to offer sellers more initially to get them to sign.
One special case of interest is when sellers receive no network benefits (αS = βS = 0). This ap-
proximates situations where sellers care primarily about how much money they can raise selling their
services to the platform, and not how many buyers they will ultimately reach. In this case, Proposition
6 implies a unique equilibrium in which sellers are paid the buyers’ network benefits to sign exclusively
with the incumbent in the first stage. This is the most the incumbent can offer sellers for signing with
it. Interestingly, this seems to fit the Pay-TV setting quite well.
For instance, recently the Media Development Authority (MDA) in Singapore (see www.mda.gov.sg)
investigated the use of StarHub’s (the incumbent Pay-TV operator) practice of signing up content
providers such as ESPN and HBO exclusively to its network.9 The main potential entrant, SingTel,
the largest telecommunications operator in Singapore, cited these exclusive deals for a lack of interest
in entering the market. In May 2006, the MDA issued its decision that “exclusive carriage agreements
do not per se substantially foreclose potential entrant’s access to key content for the Pay-TV market in
Singapore” but that it will continue to monitor such agreements.
Since that decision, the MDA has worked with SingTel to help it try to enter the market. In the
face of SingTel’s threaten entry, the incumbent Pay-TV operator StarHub recently signed a new three-
9One obvious difference with our model is that we assume agents are atomistic. However, since our sellers have identical
interests and can coordinate, our results carry over to having just a few large sellers. An interesting extension is to consider
what would happen when buyers value some sellers more than others, and platforms can discriminate between sellers.
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year exclusive deal with English Premier League (EPL), the most popular sports program in Singapore.
According to industry insiders, the average cost to StarHub of the exclusive deal works out to about forteen
Singapore dollars per month per (current) subscriber, not including local production and marketing
expenses.10 This compares to the price StarHub charges consumers for its entire sports package, which
is currently fifteen dollars per month. This has led to claims that it is the threat of SingTel’s entry that
forced StarHub to pay EPL more in its exclusive deal, and as a result StarHub will have to raise its
subscription fees to consumers. Perhaps not surprisingly, there have been renewed calls for a regulatory
ban on exclusive deals, especially as negotiations with some other key content providers (such as HBO)
are yet to be finalized.
6 Concluding comments
We have studied how introductory offers, which may contain exclusivity provisions, can be used by an
incumbent to weaken a more efficient rival’s ability to compete in the face of network effects. By signing
up some consumers early with attractive offers, the incumbent increases demand for its product from
other consumers, which it exploits later on. Both consumer welfare and overall efficiency is reduced by
the use of such exclusive deals. We distinguished two scenarios depending on the scope for multihoming
(the ability of consumers to join both firms in order to obtain higher network benefits).
One case involved firms having positive costs of attracting consumers in which multihoming by
consumers is not feasible. Then since consumers anyway buy from one or other firm, there is no role for
exclusivity conditions in contracts. Rather, by getting a portion of consumers to (commit to) buy from
the incumbent initially, the incumbent raises the willingness-to-pay from the remaining consumers to the
point where, in head-to-head competition, the entrant obtains no demand. The incumbent chooses not to
sign up all consumers, since it wants to leave some consumers to exploit in the competition stage. Unlike
the standard naked exclusion literature, we obtained these results without needing to assume any scale
economies. Introducing even a trivial level of entry costs for the rival in our setting allows the incumbent
to foreclose the entrant from the market, thereby making exclusion more profitable for the incumbent
and less desirable for consumers.
The other case involved no (or more generally, low) costs of attracting consumers, such that mul-
tihoming by consumers is feasible. The ability of consumers to buy from both the incumbent and the
entrant changes the nature of the game considerably. Offers that only require consumers to commit to
purchase from the incumbent are no longer effective. Consumers will sign the contracts if they receive
a bribe for doing so, but will still join the entrant’s more desirable network subsequently. In the face of
10See “Pay TV: Conditions must be right for competition to work”. The Straits Times. November 29th, 2006 (H22).
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such multihoming, the incumbent will make its offers exclusive, preventing consumers that sign from also
buying from the entrant. The incumbent optimally signs up half of the consumers exclusively, allowing
the remaining half to multihome in the competition stage. Such contracts are anticompetitive and result
in inefficiencies. Despite this, the entrant is only partially foreclosed from the market.
The analysis is extended to two-sided markets, in which platforms seek to attract two groups of users
(buyers and sellers), each of whom values the other. In this context, we allow platforms to make different
offers to buyers and sellers so there is a natural form of price discrimination. Moreover, we adopt the
realistic feature that only sellers can receive exclusive deals (on the buyers’ side, Nintendo cannot stop
consumers from purchasing rival consoles). When exclusive deals are not offered, the incumbent loses out
to the more desirable entrant. The incumbent therefore offers exclusive deals in the first stage, signing up
sellers exclusively so as to prevent multihoming, and extracts the full network benefits from buyers. The
entrant is fully foreclosed. However, unlike the one-sided case, one group of users (i.e. sellers) can end
up better off as a result of exclusive deals. In fact, sellers may be the primary beneficiaries of exclusive
deals.
Relative to the existing literature on naked exclusion, our model introduces two new features —
network effects and multihoming. Both effects arise naturally together as multihoming is a way for
consumers to enjoy greater network benefits when networks are incompatible. It was these features,
rather than the standard scale economies that lead to anticompetitive and inefficient exclusion by the
incumbent in our model. Adding scale effects to the network effects we study can enable the incumbent
to extract more surplus from consumers, as we found in the singlehoming setting.
Without considering multihoming, the “exclusive deals” studied in much of the existing literature may
be better thought of as simply introductory offers. When consumers only want to purchase from one or
other firm, the incumbent has no need to introduce an exclusivity condition. This was the first case we
considered, in order to isolate the impact of adding network effects to the existing literature on exclusive
dealing. Our main contribution, however, was to study what happens when consumers can multihome
and firms can offer exclusive contracts. As such, it may also be interesting to study these questions in
an environment without network effects.
This most naturally arises when buyers are downstream firms, who may buy from one or both of
the competing upstream suppliers. Several authors have considered this problem when differentiated
upstream suppliers can offer contracts at the same time (among them Besanko and Perry, 1994 and
Bernheim and Whinston, 1998), while another recent strand of the literature has considered the case
in which the incumbent gets to offer exclusive deals first but assumes upstream suppliers are identical
(for example, Fumagalli and Motta, 2006 and Abito and Wright, 2007). This leaves one important case
undone, in which an incumbent retains its first mover advantage in offering exclusive deals, while the
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potential entrant offers a differentiated product so that there is a natural reason for distinct competing
downstream retailers to want to multihome.
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Figure 1: Demand equilibrium in Lemma 1
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Figure 2: Demand equilibrium in Proposition 3
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Figure 3: Demand equilibrium in Proposition 4 with non-exclusive prices
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